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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
Appellate Court No. 20061101 -CA 
RAYMOND GLEN DODGE, ) 
Defendant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance and one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, all first-degree felonies, all in violation of §58-37-8(1 )(a). 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
RULING TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR DRUG CONVICTIONS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not preserved for appeal, but 
should be ruled to be plain error. The Court would then review these prejudicial 
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statements under a plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994), this Court held, "Under [the plain error] standard, 
we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error 
was both obvious and harmful". 
POINT II 
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT HIS 
WITNESSES AS GRANTED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF THE TWO CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL, AND WERE 
THE HERESAY RULES ALSO VIOLATED BY THE 
INTRODUCTION OF SAID EVIDENCE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether 
the trial court committed plain error when the hearsay statements of several 
witnesses were allowed during the trial. Because the issue was not raised with 
the trial court it should be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o 
establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged 
error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) 
an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 




WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S NUMEROUS 
FAILINGS DURING THE COURSE OF TRIAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRORS AND THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DISCUSSED IN POINTS I-III 
ABOVE CONSTITUTE HARMFUL, CUMULATIVE AND 
THEREFORE REVERSIBLE, ERROR? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The preservation of the issue for appeal was 
discussed in Points I-III above. For this Court to find an error harmful it must 
determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent the 
error. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8(1) 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results 
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 
37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more 
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is 
guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is 
guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) 
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate 
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
5 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of 
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining, and the state engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
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(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the 
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of 
character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide 
case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
RULE 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations 
in which the declarant: 
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
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A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing 
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the 
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in 
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. 
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's 
death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended 
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim 
by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge 
of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and 
death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, 
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to 
be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with two counts of Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance and one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, all first-degree felonies. (R. 1-3) The Defendant was tried 
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before a jury on November 13 & 14, 2006, empanelled by the Honorable W. 
Brent West. The jury found the Defendant guilty of all charges. On November 
17, 2006, the Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of not less than 
five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. The Defendant is 
currently serving this term at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with distribution of a controlled substance 
revolving around two separate incidents involving a confidential informant. The 
confidential informant in the particular case, John Empey, was referred to as 
C.I.318. His identity was revealed during the course of the trial, but he never 
testified during the course of the trial. During the course of the trial numerous 
statements attributable to the confidential informant came out, all without any 
objection by the defense. Officer Watanabe testified that the confidential 
informant "stated that he could purchase heroin from Ray." (R. 117/97) He 
testified about the confidential informant's alleged conversation with the 
Defendant, without objection by the defense counsel. (R. 117/106) The 
transaction was apparently going to occur at a parking lot of Stimpson's market. 
Officer Watanabe listened to the conversation on the recording device and 
testified, without objection by Defendant, regarding what occurred during the 
alleged transaction. (R. 117/115) 
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Officer Brandon Beck testified that on March 16, 2006, he met with the 
confidential informant to conduct a controlled drug purchase. Officer Beck also 
testified that he listened to the confidential informant's side of a telephone 
conversation allegedly made with the Defendant, and testified that the 
confidential informant informed him that the Defendant had made the decision 
where the controlled drug purchase was to occur. (R.117/130, 131) Officer Beck 
testified that he got into the back seat of the vehicle and observed a transaction 
wherein John Empey gave the Defendant $100, and the Defendant gave John 
Empey some drugs. (R.l 17/138) 
After Officer Beck testified, the prosecution informed the court that they 
would not be calling John Empey to the stand as he had refused to testify. The 
Defendant instructed his trial counsel to object on confrontation clause issues 
which the trial court overruled. The substance to this objection is interesting and 
is repeated here as follows: 
The other thing is I have talked to my client about this. He is under the 
impression that he has a right to face his accusers, and his accusers, in his 
mind, are Mr. Ferrell and Mr. Empey. In my mind his accusers are the 
Weber County—Weber/Morgan Strike Force. But just to make a record of 
that particular issue, he believes he's not being allowed the right to face his 
accusers, being Mr. Empey and Mr. Ferrell. (R.l 17/153) 
The second controlled drug purchase occurred on May 17, 2006. Officer 
Watanabe again testified regarding telephone conversation he overheard 
involving John Empey without any objection by defense counsel. During this 
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conversation Mr. Empey apparently told the officer that he had arranged another 
drug deal. (R. 117/165) Apparently John Empey had a conversation by phone 
with an individual by the name of Robert Farrell. Again, without any objection 
by defense counsel, the officer testified as to the content of the conversation in 
which the second drug purchase was discussed. (R. 117/167) All of these 
conversations involved hearsay and double or triple hearsay statements. One of 
these conversations resulted in the officer testifying that this particular buy was to 
occur in the parking lot of Shopko. 
Officer Schulz then, without objection from defense counsel, offered 
hearsay testimony regarding the previous buy although he was not involved in 
that purchase. (R. 117/190) Although Officer Schulz took the confidential 
informant and Mr. Ferrell to the scene, he dropped them off across the street and 
eventually lost contact with Mr. Ferrell, and therefore did not see the transaction. 
(R. 117/198) 
Officer Johnson testified that he observed Mr. Ferrell arrive at the ShopKo 
parking lot, observed him meet with the Defendant, but did not see a transaction 
occur. (R.l 17/212) Officer Johnson followed Mr. Ferrell after the meeting with 
the Defendant and placed him under arrest. (R.l 17/214) Pursuant to a search 
incident to arrest Officer Johnson located five bindles of heroin on Mr. Ferrell. 
(R.l 17/215) Officer Grogan testified that he observed the Defendant hand an 
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unknown item to Mr. Ferrell, but did not see Mr. Ferrell hand anything to the 
Defendant. (R.117/225) During the course of the trial, no one testified as to what 
was given by the Defendant to Mr. Ferrell. 
Officer Haney testified, again without objection from the Defendant, that 
he had known the Defendant from his involvement in a prior purchase of heroin. 
(R.l 18/6) Officer Haney testified that he observed the Defendant reached into his 
pocket and hand something to Mr. Ferrell, and observed Mr. Ferrell hand 
something to the Defendant. (R.l 18/11) Officer Haney then followed the 
Defendant into the store and placed him under arrest. Pursuant to a search 
incident to arrest the officer located additional heroin on the Defendant. 
(R.118/14) 
After the alleged drug deal occurred both the Defendant as well as Ferrell 
were arrested. (R.l 17/176) The Defendant was found to be in possession of a 
large amount of heroin and also in possession of a $100 bill with a serial number 
that matched the number previously recorded by the strike force prior to the 
purchase. (R.l 17/176) 
During the course of the trial defense counsel introduced information that 
Officer Watanabe had dealt with the Defendant for the past 20 years in criminal 
matters, including possible drug usage. (R.l 17/124) Defense counsel also asked 
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Officer Beck about the fact that the Defendant had two prior convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance. (R.l 17/145) 
It is enlightening to note that during the course of the two-day trial, defense 
counsel made only two objections. The first objection, regarding the 
confrontation clause issue, was made by defense counsel at the insistence of 
Defendant in an apologetic tone. The only other objection was made after the 
conclusion of the trial in response to the prosecution using the word opinion in his 
closing statement. (R.l 18/63) Interestingly the prosecution objected to the 
introduction of Mr. Dodge's criminal history by defense counsel, which objection 
was overruled. (R.l 17/145) 
The jury convicted the defendant of all charges. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The overriding issue on appeal is that the Defendant was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. This ineffectiveness was manifest at numerous 
stages of the trial. First, counsel was apparently unaware that the fact that 
Defendant was selling drugs to fuel a drug habit did not constitute a defense to the 
crimes charged. During the course of the trial the defense counsel elicited 
testimony from several witnesses that the Defendant had been previously 
convicted of at least two felony drug convictions. The trial court allowed this 
evidence to be presented to the jury without conducting a Rule 403 analysis. 
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The vast majority of the evidence produced at trial implicating the 
Defendant in the various charges consisted of hearsay or double hearsay 
testimony of various officers from the Weber/Morgan strike force. The two 
informants used in the drug transactions did not testify at trial, but their 
statements were allowed into evidence due to trial counsel's failure to lodge a 
timely objection. Furthermore these statements were in direct violation of the 
Defendant's constitutional right to confront his witnesses. The Defendant 
instructed defense counsel to object to this confrontation clause violation, which 
objection was overruled by the trial court. 
Finally, the cumulative effect of these errors and defective representation 
resulted in prejudice to the Defendant and undermined the fundamental fairness 
of his trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
RULING TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR DRUG CONVICTIONS. 
During the course of the trial, defense counsel attempted to introduce 
evidence regarding the Defendant's prior record for felony drug usage. (TR. 
/145) Ironically the prosecution objected to the entry of this evidence on the 
grounds that defense counsel was attempting to establish the Defendant did use 
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drugs but did not distribute them. (TR/146) Unfortunately the trial court failed to 
conduct a Rule 403 analysis of this evidence and simply allowed the introduction 
of this evidence. Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel failed to properly 
preserve these issues for appeal, and therefore this Court should review these 
prejudicial statements under a plain error standard. This is a rather unusual case, 
however, because an objection was in fact made to the introduction of this 
evidence by the prosecution. While Defendant recognizes that this is not proper 
preservation of an issue on appeal, this is a uniquely hybrid situation where the 
objection was not properly preserved; however, the trial court was aware of the 
issues and was therefore able to deal with them at the trial court level. 
In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this 
Court held, "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless we 
determine that an error existed, and that the error w7as both obvious and harmful." 
The Court further ruled, "An error is harmful if the likelihood of a different result 
is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (Id at 1010/ This 
Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 1990) has 
held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found to 
be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error." This Court further observed, "In 
such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of objection". 
(Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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In the present case defense counsel elected to put this information in front of a 
jury under some convoluted theory that if the Defendant were to have sold illegal 
drugs for purposes of sustaining his own drug habit, this fact somehow 
constituted a defense to the crime charged. The logic of defense counsel in this 
particular case defies explanation. Even the most cursory reading of the drug 
distribution statutes gives no indication that culpability is somehow reduced if the 
motivation for distribution was to fuel a drug habit. Furthermore, defense counsel 
argued in closing statements that the Defendant did not distribute controlled 
substances. Obviously evidence of prior drug involvement would only undermine 
this argument. 
Based upon the fact that the trial court was at least aware that this evidence 
was being introduced to the jury and there was some objectionable element to this 
evidence, the trial court should have conducted a Rule 403 analysis before 
allowing this information into evidence. In the case of State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 
8, Tf 33, 994 P.2d 177, the Court ruled that the trial court erred in allowing the 
inquiry into the evidence of facts surrounding prior convictions, but did not 
reverse as the error was harmless. In that case, the Court ruled: 
We do not agree that the details of the defendant's prior convictions 
are relevant to his state of mind at the time of the traffic stop. When 
impeaching a defendant, it is permissible to inquire into the fact and 
nature of the prior conviction, but not the details or circumstances 
surrounding the event, absent unusual circumstances. See State v. 
Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982). Inquiry into the "nature" 
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of prior convictions is limited due to the prejudicial effect it may 
have on the jury. "[I]nquiry into the details of prior convictions [has] 
been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error." State v. 
Tucker, 800P.2d 819, 821. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other worlds, 
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 402 and 403. 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the rule of other crime evidence 
under Rule 404(b) in recent years. The Court in 1997 issued the opinion of State 
v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997); and then in 1999 issued the opinion of 
State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in which they reassessed and to some 
extent overruled Doporto. 
In the case of State v. Decorso, the Court held "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
exercise of that discretion." (Id at 843, emphasis added) The Court then 
described the required two-pronged analysis the trial court must utilize in making 
a ruling on this issue. First, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is 
being offered for a proper noncharacter purpose. Second, the trial court must 
determine whether the evidence tends to prove some fact material to the crime 
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charged, and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. (Id at 843,844) 
In the present case, the trial court did neither. Conceivably, it could be 
argued that the court followed and agreed with defense counsel's representation 
that it was to be offered for purposes of showing that the Defendant had 
previously processed illegal narcotics. The problem is that this reason is not one 
of the listed non-character purposes in 404(b). Furthermore, this particular 
evidence does nothing to "prove some fact material to the crime charged". (Id at 
844) At best, defense counsel was attempting to prove that the Defendant was 
selling drugs in an effort to fuel his own drug habit. This is not an element of the 
offense, nor is it an affirmative defense of any sort. The trial court made no 
analysis of the probative value of the evidence, but simply allowed the evidence 
to be introduced at trial. 
Rule 404(b) also provides: "In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of 402 and 403." Even if the trial court determined that this 
evidence somehow fell within the parameters of "other purposes", there still 
exists the problem that the record is absolutely devoid of any analysis under Rule 
403 of the prejudicial effect that this evidence would have on the Defendant in the 
minds of the jury. Such an analysis is required both under Rule 404(b) as well as 
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by State v. Decorso and its progeny. In the case of State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, \ 
24 108 P.3d 730, the Court held: 
Finally, even if evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose and is relevant, a district court must determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence, (citations omitted)1 
In the case of State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, | 12, 15 P.3d 635, this 
Court ruled that the admission of a defendant's prior burglary record in a trial on 
a charge of threatening with a dangerous weapon constituted error. This Court 
stated: 
Accordingly, the nature of defendant's prior conviction for 
burglary neither has any bearing on defendant's veracity as a 
witness, nor is such a conviction admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 
In fact, we are unable to discern any probative value that 
defendant's burglary conviction might have on the present matter. 
(Id. At 638) 
In the case at bar, the trial court was presented with absolutely no 
information regarding the probative value of the evidence. The fact that defense 
counsel introduced this evidence does not somehow magically absolve the trial 
court of the requirement of conducting a Rule 403 analysis. If such an analysis 
had been conducted, the trial court would have readily determined, and perhaps 
1
 See also State v.Colwell 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000), where the Prosecution 
committed error in inquiring into the particulars of the defendant's previous 
convictions which were divulged in his direct examination. 
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enlightened defense counsel, that his theory that prior usage of narcotics drugs 
would somehow diminish the defendant's liability in this situation was illogical 
and erroneous. Defense counsel argued in closing statements that the Defendant 
did not sell drugs as alleged. There is simply no rational explanation why defense 
counsel would simultaneously argue that if the Defendant sold drugs he did so to 
fuel a drug habit. The drug statutes do not make an exception for selling drugs to 
fuel a drug habit. 
The fact that defense counsel led the trial court into the error would appear 
to trigger the invited error doctrine, which would then preclude the Defendant 
from now raising the issue of plain error. The invited error doctrine provides that, 
"on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1220 (Utah 1993)(footnote omitted). 
However, "if counsel's decision in leading the court into error falls below 
the standard of reasonable professional practice, we may find that counsel was 
ineffective." Id. Therefore, this Court is back to determining whether these 
eiTors were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel will be 
more fully discussed in Points III and IV below. 
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This Court can also apply "the exceptional circumstances" concept to avoid 
"a manifest injustice." See, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 
186. This concept is "used sparingly, properly preserved for truly exceptional 
situations . . . involving 'rare procedural anomalies.'" State v. McCloud 2005 UT 
App 466, % 14, 126 P.3d 775, 778 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting, State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In McCloud, this Court applied the 
"exceptional circumstances" doctrine where a legal issue concerning the statute of 
limitations was decided after the defendant's trial. This Court reduced a 
conviction from aggravated sexual abuse of a child to sexual abuse of a child 
since the sexual abuse of a child is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child and this offense was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 779. 
Finally, the Defendant is required to show that the plain error missed by the 
trial court must be prejudicial. In State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^ 39 994 P.2d 177, 
the Court held: 
Whether an improper statement in closing remarks constitutes 
reversible error depends on (1) whether the remarks call to the 
attention of jurors matters which they could not properly consider 
in determining their verdict; and (2) the prejudicial effect of the 
statement on the defendant's case. If detemiined to be harmful, 
improper statements will require reversal. To obtain a reversal, the 
defendant must show that the prosecutor's remarks were obviously 
improper and harmful. (Citations omitted) 
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In the present case the harmful effects are obvious. The Constitution of 
both the State of Utah as well as the United States provides a defendant the right 
to trial before an impartial jury. This requirement has been codified and couched 
in the terms of a presumption of innocence. That presumption of innocence was 
destroyed in the present case by the acts of defense counsel proceeding in a 
manner that was ineffective and prejudicial. The fact that the Defendant had 
numerous prior felony drug-related convictions would certainly poison the jury in 
their efforts to presume the Defendant innocent as instructed by the trial court. In 
a trial where there was no evidence introduced via testimony of the confidential 
informants who actually consummated the alleged drug deals, any prejudicial 
effect of the Defendant's prior drug history would be magnified. Furthermore, 
defense counsel lost all credibility by implying on the one hand the defendant was 
selling drugs to fuel a drug habit, but then arguing to the jury in closing 
statements that these alleged sales did not occur. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT HIS 
WITNESSES AS GRANTED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED 
BY ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF THE TWO CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL. HERESAY 
RULES WERE ALSO VIOLATED BY THE INTRODUCTION 
OF SAID EVIDENCE 
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The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a fundamental 
right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See, State v. 
Moosman, 194 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah 1990). The Defendant's constitutional right 
to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed hearsay evidence 
on several important issues from numerous State's witnesses. 
The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these 
important witnesses against him. The jury heard statements from numerous 
officers testifying as to conversations that they overheard or conversations that 
they were told occurred by the confidential informant. All of these statements 
were hearsay since John Empey and Robert Farrell did not testify. Many of the 
statements were double hearsay since they were supposedly recitations of 
statements made by the Defendant to John Empey which were then related to the 
officers. Some of the statements constituted triple and even quadruple hearsay 
where an officer testified as to what other officers told them John Empey said and 
that Mr. Ferrell told them things the Defendant supposedly uttered. 
In State v. Moosman, 19 A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront witnesses, it 
should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a two-part test to 
evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation. Id. "First, we look 
at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of extrajudicial 
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statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or 'devastating' to the 
defendant.'" Id 
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearly devastating to the 
Defendant. Virtually the entire substance of evidence produced at trial was 
hearsay. Although several officers testified as to watching portions of 
transactions occur, the only unifying thread of that testimony were the hearsay 
statements made by John Empey regarding the Defendant's alleged involvement 
in these transactions. Particularly the evidence of the second transaction is 
suspect due to the fact that the police used an unwitting informant (Ferrell) to 
conduct the alleged transaction. The officers obviously did not have an 
opportunity to search Mr. Ferrell prior to the transaction, and no officers saw 
specifically what was passed between Mr. Ferrell and the Defendant. 
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant, the first part 
of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is to "look at the availability 
of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add any probative 
value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the 
witness." Id. 
This part of the test is rather obvious. In this particular case the two 
hearsay witnesses were both individuals heavily involved in the criminal world. 
The one individual was working with the police in exchange for money. His 
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motive for falsity would be significant. The other individual, apparently had no 
hesitations in performing illegal acts, and was ultimately arrested and convicted 
of these charges. The fact that the State did not have to put two criminal 
individuals on the stand to testify and be subject to cross-examination is 
significant. The fact that defense counsel was unable to cross-examine and 
established biases, inconsistencies, and possible ulterior motives undermines the 
abilities of even an effective defense counsel. 
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme 
Court articulated a two-part test for determining the admissibility of hearsay when 
a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial. First, there must 
be a showing of 'unavailability.' Second, if the declarant is unavailable, the 
statement at issue is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Id. 
at 56, 1000 S.Ct. at 2539 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically 
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. at 402 (quoting, State v. Webb, 
779P.2dat l l l3) . 
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will 
not be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand or 
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... testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be made to 
produce the witness." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
Pursuant to Rule 804(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, both Empy and 
Ferrell could be declared an unavailable witness. However, when that occurred, 
then 804(b) applies. That section indicates which kinds of testimony are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. There 
are four areas; one involves former testimony; one involves a statement under 
belief of impending death; and the other a statement of personal or family history. 
These clearly do not apply. The only one that applies is 804(b)(3) which allows 
admission of a statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to 
the defendant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or intended to subject the 
declarant to civil or criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In other 
words, it is clear that if a declarant refuses to testify the State then could use such 
a statement against him. Using that statement against the defendant is another 
matter altogether. In State vs. Sanders 27 UT 2d 354 496 P 2d 270 (Utah 1972), 
the Court held that the admission against interest exception to the hearsay rule did 
not permit the use of out of court statements of a declarant that included 
admissions that implicated another named person against that person. 
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The obvious difficulty with such a provision would be that it violates the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The right of a Defendant, in a 
criminal case to confront his accusers is paramount and supersedes any limitation 
or exception through hearsay rules. The United States Supreme Court has 
recently ruled on this issue in the case of Crawford vs. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
124 S. Ct. 1354 U.S. (2004). In that case, Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous 
Court, held that the use of an out of court statement by a wife against her 
husband, when his claims of marital privilege precluded her in court testimony, 
would not be allowed because, where testimonial statements are at issue, the only 
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
confrontation." Emphasis added. 
The issue on the confrontation clause implications was preserved by a 
timely motion by defense counsel. During the course of the trial, defense 
counsel, at the insistence of the defendant stated, 
The other thing is I have talked to my client about this. He is under 
the impression that he has a right to face his accusers, and his 
accusers, in his mind, are Mr. Ferrell and Mr. Empey. In my mind 
his accusers are the Weber County—Weber/Morgan Strike Force. 
But just to make a record of that particular issue, he believes he's 
not being allowed the right to face his accusers, being Mr. Empey 
and Mr. Ferrell. (TR/153) 
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While defendant recognizes that, due to the wording of this objection, this 
issue also may be considered invited error, the openness and obviousness of this 
fundamental constitutional right should have required intervention by the trial 
court. Defendant would reiterate the invited error discussion in Point I above. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S NUMEROUS 
FAILING DURING THE COURSE OF TRIAL. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting, "The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
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simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) 
Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of 
counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance" (Id. 
at 688), it did mention certain minimal requirements. Additionally, the 
overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's 
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688) See also 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) 
and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 
2003) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this 
Court found held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment 
violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. The Court 
held that, "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate 
tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is 
satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 
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In several recent memorandum decisions^ the Utah Court of Appeals has 
reversed cases based on obvious ineffective assistance claims. In the recent 
memorandum decision of State v. Scuderi, 2004 WL 2821676 (Utah App.), 2004 
UT App 464, the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose counsel had 
failed to move to dismiss under the Utah Speedy Trial Statute when it was clear 
the case had not been brought to trial within the 120 day limit. In the case of State 
v. Nelson, 2004 WL 2610521 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 421, the Court reversed 
the conviction of a defendant whose counsel failed to file alibi notices on two 
material witnesses for the defense. This failure was held to meet both prongs of 
the Strickland test and required reversal. In the case of State v. Bleazsard, 2004 
WL 2250908 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 351, the Court of Appeals reversed on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims a conviction obtained where the defense 
attorney failed to notify the state of two witnesses who would have testified as to 
the alleged rape victim's prior false claim of rape against one of the witnesses. 
In the case of State v. Ison, 2004 UT App 252, Tj 23, 96 P.3d 374, the Court 
again addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel 
failed to move to admit into evidence a previous finding by an Administrative 
Law Judge that contained admissible exculpatory evidence. The Court further 
While defendant recognizes the Court's caution in use of memorandum 
decisions, these cited cases demonstrate some apparent Sixth Amendment 
failings. 
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found trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's instruction 
to the jury that was incorrect. 
In the case of State v. Bennett 2000 UT 34, \ 13, 999 P.2d 1, 3, Justice 
Durham, in a concurring opinion noted: 
This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been 
recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 
442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case), 
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we 
may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and 
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual 
prejudice" 
In the present case, the representation of the Defendant taken as a whole 
was defective and constitutionally inadequate. Trial counsel failed to make any 
motions in limine to prevent the introduction of evidence of the Defendant's prior 
drug usage. To further compound his ineffectiveness, defense counsel introduced 
highly prejudicial and clearly objectionable evidence regarding the Defendant's 
prior convictions of drug charges. Given the nature of the charges in the present 
case, and the fact that they constituted first-degree felonies, defense counsel may 
have been advised to research some of these issues prior to trial. Had trial 
counsel understood that selling drugs to fuel a drug habit was not a defense to any 
of the charges, he may not have asked these highly prejudicial questions. 
That blunder alone demonstrates that "counsel's performance fell below 
the level of reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged." 
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(Kimmelman v. Morrison, at 386) See also State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 
P.2d 1243. 
Additionally, Defense counsel was oblivious to the issues raised in Point II 
of this brief regarding the hearsay and confrontation doctrines and the attending 
constitutional violations. Defense counsel apparently was not cognizant of this 
area of law. 
Finally, even when marshaling the evidence and applying logic that most 
favors a finding of effective assistance of counsel, there is simply "no conceivable 
legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions." The State cannot argue 
any tactical reason to allow evidence of the Defendant's prior drug usage to come 
out before the jury. This is especially true when the Defendant is accused of 
selling the very illegal substances he was previously convicted of possessing. 
There was simply no tactical reason not to raise the confrontation clause issues, 
and there was no tactical reason to allow evidence of the Defendant's prior bad 
acts. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Sfrickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
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In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that to meet the second part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." {Id. at 187 
quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the 
determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider 
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors 
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly 
the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
In the present case, the numerous errors during trial clearly indicate there is 
a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. This 
is a case where the vast majority of evidence implicating the Defendant was 
provided through hearsay evidence in violation of the confrontation clause of the 
Constitution. Without this direct evidence the State would have been in a much 
more difficult position in trying to establish each element of the offenses charged. 
In both of the alleged transactions, there is significant question as to exactly what 
transpired and particularly what was exchanged between the individuals. 
Effective counsel may have been able to cross-examine Mr. Empey regarding 
exactly what transpired in these alleged purchases. It is possible, (and 
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periodically occurs) that the confidential informant sets up a buy and lies about 
the outcome with a motive to retaliate against a defendant or to simply make 
money (as occurred in the present case). Proper cross examination of the 
confidential informant would allow defense counsel to explore the issues as to the 
thoroughness of the search of the confidential informant, the possible presence of 
drugs hidden in places not searched by the officers, and potential debts owed by 
the confidential informant to the Defendant which would explain the transfer of 
money. 
This is even more critical where the use of an unwitting informant 
constitutes the evidence against the Defendant at trial. In that particular instance, 
competent counsel could explore numerous exculpatory areas that might have led 
to an acquittal. 
Finally, the introduction of evidence regarding a defendant's prior drug 
history serves absolutely no purpose other than to denigrate the defendant in the 
eyes of the jury. The fact that defense counsel himself introduced this evidence 
establishes clearly this ineffectiveness. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORS AND THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DISCUSSED IN POINTS I-VI 
ABOVE CONSTITUTES HARMFUL, CUMULATIVE AND 
THEREFORE REVERSIBLE, ERROR 
The cumulative error doctrine provides for reversal "if the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^ 41, 72 P.3d 127, 134 (citations 
omitted). The appellant is generally required to prove that the mistakes made by 
the trial court were not only errors under the law, but that they were harmful. 
The general rule regarding the determination as to whether or not an error 
requires reversal is that the error must be harmful. See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) for plain error; State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 
1140 (Utah 1989) on evidentiary rulings; and State v. Decor so. 993 P.2d 837, 846 
(Utah 1999) for abuse of discretion. For this Court to find that the error is harmful 
it must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome 
absent the error. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Knight 734 P.2d 
913, 920 (Utah 1987) made an exliaustive analysis of the term reasonable 
likelihood with the conclusion as follows: 
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
This is certainly above the "mere possibility' point on the spectrum. 
If it is "more probable than not" that the outcome of trial would have 
been different, then a court cannot possibly place confidence in the 
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verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that confidence 
in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short 
of the "more probable than not" portion of the spectrum. It may not 
be possible to define "reasonable likelihood" much more explicitly 
than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in deciding 
whether an error requires reversal. 
The Defendant would submit that applying this definition of reasonable 
likelihood Xo the case at hand requires this Court to combine the detrimental effect 
of all errors in this analysis. The problem with the present case is that we have 
an abundance of extraneous evidence that was admitted before the jury. There 
was significant prejudicial evidence of the character of the Defendant including 
evidence elicited by defense counsel that the Defendant had been previously 
convicted on at least two occasions of illegal drug usage. This evidence clearly 
showed a propensity of the Defendant to commit the crimes in question. 
In addition, there were several errors that directly impacted the foundation 
of the verdicts. First, the Defendant was convicted almost entirely upon hearsay 
and double hearsay testimony. Second, despite a request by the Defendant to 
object to a confrontation clause violation, defense counsel as well as the trial 
court allowed this evidence to come before the jury which resulted in the 
Defendant's convictions. 
Finally, the clear ineffective assistance of counsel further undermines the 
confidence that the Defendant had a fair trial. 
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These problems clearly erode confidence in the verdict. The result is that 
these errors constitute harm to the Defendant and require reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, there can be no question that the Defendant did 
not receive a fair trial. The combination of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
improper character evidence, improper reference to the Defendant's prior drug 
convictions, and the introduction at trial of hearsay evidence which violated the 
Defendant's constitutional rights resulted in a conviction that does not meet the 
standards required by this Court. The cumulative effect of the improperly offered 
and admitted evidence and the ineffective assistance of counsel in this case can 
only be cured by a reversal and remand for a_new trial. 
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Tape Count: 9:33 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/14/2006 Guilty 
2. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/14/2006 Guilty 
3. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/14/2006 Guilty 
TRIAL 
Second day of trial. Jury trial continued. State calls witnesses 
Steve Haney and Boe Smith. Each witness is sworn and testifies. 
State rests their case. 
Defense makes a motion to dismiss. Parties argue the motion. Court 
denies. 
Att Ljlacy Cole makes his openrnq statement to the jury. The 
defendant chooses not to testify 
Paap 1 
Case No: 061502441 
Date: Nov 14, 2 006 
The defense calls no witnesses. 
Jury is instructed. 
COUNT: 12:08 
Jury retires to deliberate. 
COUNT: 2:07 
Jury returns with their verdicts of guilty to the Fl Distribution 
of Controlled Substance, guilty to the Fl Possession of Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, and guilty to Fl Distribution 
of Controlled Substance. 
The Jury finds "true11 to the three drug free zone enhancements. 
The defense requests the jury be polled. All agree with the 
verdict. 
The jury is thanked and excused. 
The defendant waives the time for sentencing and requests to be 
sentenced today. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/ OFFER /ARRANGE TO 
D1ST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may 
be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 061902441 
Date: Nov 14, 2 0 0G 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court runs the 5-Life on counts two and thrt 
runs them consecutive to the 5-Life on count one 
credit for the time he has served. 
concurrent b^t 
Defendant oranted 
uated t h i s ! * aay or m^fp{%rft CsU . 
W 3RENT WEST 
District Court Judge 




THE COURT: OKAY. SO --
MR. COLE: SO WE'RE MOVING TO HAVE HIM RELEASED AS 
WELL. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN HE CAN BE SENT BACK. 
MR. DECARIA: OKAY. NOW, THE OTHER QUESTION I HAVE 
IS BRANDON BECK JUST TESTIFIED, BUT WE'RE DONE WITH HIM. 
MR. COLE: YEAH, I DON'T NEED HIM. 
MR. DECARIA: I WOULD ASK THAT HE BE EXCUSED AS 
WELL. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTIONS? 
MR. COLE: NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
THE COURT: HE MAY BE EXCUSED AS WELL. 
MR. COLE: THE OTHER THING IS I HAVE TALKED TO MY 
CLIENT ABOUT THIS. HE IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS A 
EIGHT TO FACE HIS ACCUSER, AND HIS ACCUSERS, IN HIS MIND, ARE 
MR. FARRELL AND MR. EMPEY. IN MY MIND, HIS ACCUSERS ARE THE 
WEBER COUNTY -- WEBER-MORGAN STRIKE FORCE. 
BUT JUST TO MAKE RECORD OF THAT PAPTICULAP ISSUE, HE 
BELIEVES HE'S NOT BEING ALLOWED THE EIGHT TO FACE HIS 
ACCUSERS, BEING MR. EMPEY AND MR. FARPELL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. STATE WANT TO RESPOND TO THAT? 
MR. DECARIA: YOUR HONOR, THE ACCUSERS HERE ARE THE 
STRIKE FORCE. THE OTHEP TWO — TWO INDIVIDUALS NAMED ARE 
INCIDENTAL TO THIS. THEY WERE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO BROUGHT 
























COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. COLE, CROSS? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
THAT JOHN EMPEY WAS WORKING FOR 
VOLUNTARILY? 
RIGHT? OKAY. 
IS THAT FAIR 
A C.I. AND AS 
AND YOU'D HAD PR 
TO SAY? 
A DRUG USER? 
YOU AS A 









Q. OKAY. AND YOU SAID HE'S NOT -- NOW, YOU HEARD -- YOU'VE 
BEEN HERE WHEN MR. DECARIA SAID HE'S NOT GOING TO TESTIFY 
TODAY. 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW WHY HE'S NOT GOING TO TESTIFY TODAY? 
A. I -- I DON'T. 
Q. DID HE MENTION ANYTHING TO YOU WHEN YOU AND MR. DECARIA 
WENT TO TALK TO HIM EARLIER? 
A. JUST THAT HE — HE FELT LIKE HE DIDN'T WANT TO, SO ~ 
Q. OKAY. BECAUSE IF HE TESTIFIES, BEING IN PRISON, IT'S NOT 
EXACTLY A HEALTHY DECISION, IS IT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU NIK TESTED THE DRUGS THAT WERE 
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TAKEN, DID YOU NIK TEST EACH BAG INDIVIDUALLY OP DID YOU JUST 
PICK OUT A SAMPLE FROM ONE? 
A. I PICKED OUT A SAMPLE FROM ONE. 
Q. OKAY. AND — LET'S BRING IT OUT NOW. MR. DECARIA 
ALLUDED TO A PAST HISTORY WITH MP. DODGE THAT YOU KNOW HIM 
FROM PAST EXPERIENCE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU'RE A POLICE OFFICER FOR A LIVING? 
A. (NODS HEAD.) 
Q. AND HAVE BEEN FOR 20 YEARS? 
A. YES. 
Q. SO WHEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT PAST HISTORY WITH RAY DODGE, 
IT'S DEALING IN CRIMINAL MATTERS. IS THAT FAIR ENOUGH TO 
SAY? 
A. IT IS. 
Q. AND IN YOUR EXPERIENCE DEALING WITH RAY DODGE, DO YOU 
KNOW HIM AS A DRUG USER? 
A. NO. 





















Q. DID YOU NOTICE TWO PRIOR CONVICTIONS ON THERE FOR 
POSSESSION OP USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE? 
A. I DON'T RECALL AT THIS TIME IF I -- I REMEMBER LOOKING UP 
HIS HISTORY, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER HIS PEC — HIS RECORD. 
MR. COLE: MAY I APPROACH FOP JUST A MOMENT? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. COLE: APPROACH FOR JUST A MOMENT. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(MR. COLE TENDERS DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.) 
Q. (BY MR. COLE) WHAT I'VE PLACED IN FRONT OF YOU IS A 
RECORD OF MR. DODGE'S CRIMINAL HISTORY. AND DOES IT SHOW 
THAT HE HAS TWO PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE? 
A. IT DOES. 
Q. OKAY. SO NOT JUST DISTRIBUTION, BUT ALSO A USER. 
MR. DECARIA: I'M GOING TO OBJECT. THA/I' S NOT THE 
IMPORT FROM THAT THING. THE CHARGE WOULD BE POSSESSION OR 
USE, BUT YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT'S SIMPLE POSSESSION OR 
POSSESSION OR USE. AND POSSESSION CAM BE FOR PURPOSES OF 
DISTRIBUTION AND NOT FOR USE. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED AT THIS POINT. 
MR. COLE: OKAY. 
Q. (BY MR. COLE) TYPICALLY WHEN SOMEONE GETS ARRESTED, 
WHETHER THEY GET CHARGED WITH DISTRIBUTION DEPENDS ON MANY 
25 I FACTORS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
